[yocto] [meta-security][PATCH 2/2] ecryptfs-utils: add new recipe
Martin Jansa
martin.jansa at gmail.com
Fri May 19 08:26:49 PDT 2017
How does this one relate to:
http://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/meta-ivi/tree/meta-ivi/recipes-support-ivi/ecryptfs-utils/ecryptfs-utils_106.bb?h=master
the later has also support for systemd, not sure if it has the issue with
pam or not.
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 4:56 PM, Huang, Jie (Jackie) <
Jackie.Huang at windriver.com> wrote:
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: akuster808 [mailto:akuster808 at gmail.com]
> > Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 22:50
> > To: Huang, Jie (Jackie); yocto at yoctoproject.org
> > Subject: Re: [yocto] [meta-security][PATCH 2/2] ecryptfs-utils: add new
> recipe
> >
> >
> >
> > On 05/17/2017 12:56 AM, jackie.huang at windriver.com wrote:
> > > From: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang at windriver.com>
> > >
> > > eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem that ships
> > > in Linux kernel versions 2.6.19 and above. This package
> > > provides the mount helper and supporting libraries to
> > > perform key management and mount functions.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Jackie Huang <jackie.huang at windriver.com>
> >
> > This has the following warning:
> > WARNING: libpam-1.3.0-r5 do_pam_sanity: Building libpam but 'pam' isn't
> > in DISTRO_FEATURES, PAM won't work correctly
> >
> > I noticed this package has the ability to disable-pam so maybe
> > PACKAGECONFIG with the DISTRO_FEATURES check for PAM would be
> > applicable
> > in this case?
> >
> > please investigate.
>
> I will investigate and fix the warning.
>
> Thanks,
> Jackie
>
> >
> > everything else looks fine for inclusion to meta-security.
> >
> > regards,
> > Armin
> >
> > > ---
> > > .../ecryptfs-utils/ecryptfs-utils_111.bb | 52
> +++++++++++++++++
> > > .../files/ecryptfs-utils-CVE-2016-6224.patch | 65
> > ++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
> > > create mode 100644 recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/
> ecryptfs-utils_111.bb
> > > create mode 100644 recipes-security/ecryptfs-
> utils/files/ecryptfs-utils-CVE-
> > 2016-6224.patch
> > >
> > > diff --git a/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/ecryptfs-utils_111.bb
> b/recipes-
> > security/ecryptfs-utils/ecryptfs-utils_111.bb
> > > new file mode 100644
> > > index 0000000..49c2605
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/ecryptfs-utils_111.bb
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
> > > +SUMMARY = "The eCryptfs mount helper and support libraries"
> > > +DESCRIPTION = "eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem \
> > > + that ships in Linux kernel versions 2.6.19 and above. This \
> > > + package provides the mount helper and supporting libraries \
> > > + to perform key management and mount functions."
> > > +HOMEPAGE = "https://launchpad.net/ecryptfs"
> > > +SECTION = "base"
> > > +
> > > +LICENSE = "GPL-2.0"
> > > +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM =
> > "file://COPYING;md5=8ca43cbc842c2336e835926c2166c28b"
> > > +
> > > +DEPENDS = "keyutils libgcrypt libpam nss intltool-native
> glib-2.0-native"
> > > +
> > > +inherit autotools pkgconfig
> > > +
> > > +SRC_URI = "\
> > > +
> > https://launchpad.net/ecryptfs/trunk/${PV}/+
> download/${BPN}_${PV}.orig.tar.
> > gz \
> > > + file://ecryptfs-utils-CVE-2016-6224.patch \
> > > + "
> > > +
> > > +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "83513228984f671930752c3518cac6fd"
> > > +SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
> > "112cb3e37e81a1ecd8e39516725dec0ce55c5f3df6284e0f4cc0f118750a987f"
> > > +
> > > +PARALLEL_MAKEINST=""
> > > +
> > > +EXTRA_OECONF = "\
> > > + --libdir=${base_libdir} \
> > > + --disable-pywrap \
> > > + --disable-nls \
> > > + --enable-openssl=no \
> > > + "
> > > +
> > > +do_configure_prepend() {
> > > + export NSS_CFLAGS="-I${STAGING_INCDIR}/nspr4 -
> > I${STAGING_INCDIR}/nss3"
> > > + export NSS_LIBS="-L${STAGING_BASELIBDIR} -lssl3 -lsmime3 -lnss3 -
> > lsoftokn3 -lnssutil3"
> > > + export KEYUTILS_CFLAGS="-I${STAGING_INCDIR}"
> > > + export KEYUTILS_LIBS="-L${STAGING_LIBDIR} -lkeyutils"
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +do_install_append() {
> > > + chmod 4755 ${D}${base_sbindir}/mount.ecryptfs_private
> > > + mkdir -p ${D}/${libdir}
> > > + mv ${D}/${base_libdir}/pkgconfig ${D}/${libdir}
> > > + sed -i -e 's:-I${STAGING_INCDIR}::' \
> > > + -e 's:-L${STAGING_LIBDIR}::' ${D}/${libdir}/pkgconfig/
> libecryptfs.pc
> > > + sed -i -e "s: ${base_sbindir}/cryptsetup: ${sbindir}/cryptsetup:"
> > ${D}${bindir}/ecryptfs-setup-swap
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +FILES_${PN} += "${base_libdir}/security/* ${base_libdir}/ecryptfs/*"
> > > +
> > > +RDEPENDS_${PN} += "cryptsetup"
> > > +RRECOMMENDS_${PN} = "gettext-runtime"
> > > diff --git a/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/files/ecryptfs-utils-
> CVE-2016-
> > 6224.patch b/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/files/ecryptfs-utils-
> CVE-2016-
> > 6224.patch
> > > new file mode 100644
> > > index 0000000..4252f97
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/recipes-security/ecryptfs-utils/files/ecryptfs-utils-
> CVE-2016-6224.patch
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
> > > +From 558a513ba3100ea5190de1a24cf1fed663367765 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> > 2001
> > > +From: Li Zhou <li.zhou at windriver.com>
> > > +Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 10:28:08 +0800
> > > +Subject: [PATCH] ecryptfs-utils: CVE-2016-6224
> > > +
> > > +src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap: Prevent unencrypted swap partitions
> from
> > > +being automatically enabled by systemd. This bug affected GPT
> partitioned
> > > +NVMe/MMC drives and resulted in the swap partition being used without
> > > +encryption. It also resulted in a usability issue in that users were
> > > +erroneously prompted to enter a pass-phrase to unlock their swap
> partition
> > > +at boot. (LP: #1597154)
> > > +
> > > +the patch comes from:
> > > +https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-6224
> > > +https://bazaar.launchpad.net/~ecryptfs/ecryptfs/trunk/revision/882
> > > +
> > > +Upstream-Status: backport
> > > +
> > > +Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <li.zhou at windriver.com>
> > > +---
> > > + ChangeLog | 9 +++++++++
> > > + src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap | 10 ++++++++--
> > > + 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > > +
> > > +diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
> > > +index d255a94..2c9c73e 100644
> > > +--- a/ChangeLog
> > > ++++ b/ChangeLog
> > > +@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
> > > ++ecryptfs-utils-112
> > > ++ [ Jason Gerard DeRose ]
> > > ++ * src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap: Prevent unencrypted swap
> partitions from
> > > ++ being automatically enabled by systemd. This bug affected GPT
> > partitioned
> > > ++ NVMe/MMC drives and resulted in the swap partition being used
> without
> > > ++ encryption. It also resulted in a usability issue in that users
> were
> > > ++ erroneously prompted to enter a pass-phrase to unlock their swap
> > partition
> > > ++ at boot. (LP: #1597154)
> > > ++
> > > + ecryptfs-utils-74
> > > + [ Michal Hlavinka ]
> > > + * Changes for RH/Fedora release
> > > +diff --git a/src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap
> b/src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap
> > > +index 41cf18a..e4785d7 100755
> > > +--- a/src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap
> > > ++++ b/src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-swap
> > > +@@ -166,8 +166,14 @@ for swap in $swaps; do
> > > + # If this is a GPT partition, mark it as no-auto mounting, to avoid
> > > + # auto-activating it on boot
> > > + if [ "$(blkid -p -s PART_ENTRY_SCHEME -o value "$swap")" = "gpt" ];
> > then
> > > +- drive="${swap%[0-9]*}"
> > > +- partno="${swap#$drive}"
> > > ++ # Correctly handle NVMe/MMC drives, as well as any similar
> > physical
> > > ++ # block device that follow the "/dev/foo0p1" pattern (LP:
> > #1597154)
> > > ++ if echo "$swap" | grep -qE "^/dev/.+[0-9]+p[0-9]+$"; then
> > > ++ drive=$(echo "$swap" | sed
> "s:\(.\+[0-9]\)p[0-9]\+:\1:")
> > > ++ else
> > > ++ drive=$(echo "$swap" | sed
> "s:\(.\+[^0-9]\)[0-9]\+:\1:")
> > > ++ fi
> > > ++ partno=$(echo "$swap" | sed "s:.\+[^0-9]\([0-9]\+\):\1:")
> > > + if [ -b "$drive" ]; then
> > > + if printf "x\np\n" | fdisk "$drive" | grep -q
> "^$swap .*
> > GUID:.*\b63\b"; then
> > > + echo "$swap is already marked as no-auto"
> > > +--
> > > +1.9.1
> > > +
>
> --
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> yocto at yoctoproject.org
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