[yocto] [meta-security][PATCH] libcap-ng: port CVE-2014-3215 patch
Joe MacDonald
Joe_MacDonald at mentor.com
Sun Nov 30 11:45:24 PST 2014
[Re: [yocto] [meta-security][PATCH] libcap-ng: port CVE-2014-3215 patch] On 14.11.29 (Sat 20:51) akuster808 wrote:
> Joe,
>
> I went a head and updated to 7.4 which included the security fix.
> Thanks for the reminder.
Yeah, that's on my to-do list for meta-selinux, too. That's the right
course of action on this one. :-)
-J.
>
> - Armin
>
> On 11/27/2014 10:49 AM, Joe MacDonald wrote:
> >Importing the patch from meta-selinux, which itself was a backport from
> >the upstream source tree.
> >
> >Signed-off-by: Joe MacDonald <joe_macdonald at mentor.com>
> >---
> >
> >I mentioned a while back that I had at least one patch in meta-selinux that may
> >apply to meta-security as well. I don't know if you guys are interested in this
> >or not since the primary tool to demonstrate the exploit is seunshare, but it is
> >a problem in libcap-ng itself and it is exploitable outside of the selinux
> >framework.
> >
> >-J.
> >
> > .../libcap-ng/libcap-ng/CVE-2014-3215.patch | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> > recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng_0.7.3.bb | 4 +-
> > 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > create mode 100644 recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng/CVE-2014-3215.patch
> >
> >diff --git a/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng/CVE-2014-3215.patch b/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng/CVE-2014-3215.patch
> >new file mode 100644
> >index 0000000..e9164d4
> >--- /dev/null
> >+++ b/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng/CVE-2014-3215.patch
> >@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
> >+libcap-ng: local privilege escalation due to capng_lock
> >+
> >+Following the discussion here:
> >+
> >+ http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/04/29/7
> >+
> >+This is known to impact SELinux tools, however the issue could be exploited by
> >+any application using the relevant functions in libcap-ng provided it is suid
> >+root.
> >+
> >+Upstream-Status: Backport
> >+
> >+Signed-off-by: Joe MacDonald <joe_macdonald at mentor.com>
> >+
> >+diff --git a/docs/capng_lock.3 b/docs/capng_lock.3
> >+index 7683119..a070c1e 100644
> >+--- a/docs/capng_lock.3
> >++++ b/docs/capng_lock.3
> >+@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@ int capng_lock(void);
> >+
> >+ .SH "DESCRIPTION"
> >+
> >+-capng_lock will take steps to prevent children of the current process to regain full privileges if the uid is 0. This should be called while possessing the CAP_SETPCAP capability in the kernel. This function will do the following if permitted by the kernel: Set the NOROOT option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, set the NOROOT_LOCKED option to on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, set the PR_NO_SETUID_FIXUP option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, and set the PR_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS.
> >++capng_lock will take steps to prevent children of the current process from gaining privileges by executing setuid programs. This should be called while possessing the CAP_SETPCAP capability in the kernel.
> >+
> >++This function will do the following if permitted by the kernel: If the kernel supports PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it will use it. Otherwise it will set the NOROOT option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, set the NOROOT_LOCKED option to on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, set the PR_NO_SETUID_FIXUP option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, and set the PR_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS. If both fail, it will return an error.
> >+
> >+ .SH "RETURN VALUE"
> >+
> >+-This returns 0 on success and a negative number on failure. -1 means a failure setting any of the PR_SET_SECUREBITS options.
> >++This returns 0 on success and a negative number on failure. -1 means a failure to use PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and a failure setting any of the PR_SET_SECUREBITS options.
> >+
> >+ .SH "SEE ALSO"
> >+
> >+diff --git a/src/cap-ng.c b/src/cap-ng.c
> >+index bd105ba..422f2bc 100644
> >+--- a/src/cap-ng.c
> >++++ b/src/cap-ng.c
> >+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
> >+ * 2.6.24 kernel XATTR_NAME_CAPS
> >+ * 2.6.25 kernel PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAPABILITY_VERSION_2
> >+ * 2.6.26 kernel PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECURE_*_LOCKED, VERSION_3
> >++ * 3.5 kernel PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
> >+ */
> >+
> >+ /* External syscall prototypes */
> >+@@ -122,6 +123,14 @@ extern int capget(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data);
> >+ #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */
> >+ #endif
> >+
> >++/* prctl values that we use */
> >++#ifndef PR_SET_SECUREBITS
> >++#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28
> >++#endif
> >++#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
> >++#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
> >++#endif
> >++
> >+ // States: new, allocated, initted, updated, applied
> >+ typedef enum { CAPNG_NEW, CAPNG_ERROR, CAPNG_ALLOCATED, CAPNG_INIT,
> >+ CAPNG_UPDATED, CAPNG_APPLIED } capng_states_t;
> >+@@ -663,15 +672,22 @@ int capng_change_id(int uid, int gid, capng_flags_t flag)
> >+
> >+ int capng_lock(void)
> >+ {
> >+-#ifdef PR_SET_SECUREBITS
> >+- int rc = prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
> >+- 1 << SECURE_NOROOT |
> >+- 1 << SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED |
> >+- 1 << SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP |
> >+- 1 << SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED, 0, 0, 0);
> >++ int rc;
> >++
> >++ // On Linux 3.5 and up, we can directly prevent ourselves and
> >++ // our descendents from gaining privileges.
> >++ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == 0)
> >++ return 0;
> >++
> >++ // This kernel is too old or otherwise doesn't support
> >++ // PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS. Fall back to using securebits.
> >++ rc = prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
> >++ 1 << SECURE_NOROOT |
> >++ 1 << SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED |
> >++ 1 << SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP |
> >++ 1 << SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED, 0, 0, 0);
> >+ if (rc)
> >+ return -1;
> >+-#endif
> >+
> >+ return 0;
> >+ }
> >diff --git a/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng_0.7.3.bb b/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng_0.7.3.bb
> >index 3f225ba..1acf554 100644
> >--- a/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng_0.7.3.bb
> >+++ b/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng_0.7.3.bb
> >@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=94d55d512a9ba36caa9b7df079bae19f \
> > file://COPYING.LIB;md5=e3eda01d9815f8d24aae2dbd89b68b06"
> >
> > SRC_URI = "http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/libcap-ng/libcap-ng-${PV}.tar.gz \
> >- file://python.patch"
> >+ file://python.patch \
> >+ file://CVE-2014-3215.patch \
> >+ "
> >
> > inherit lib_package autotools pythonnative
> >
> >
--
-Joe MacDonald.
:wq
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