[meta-virtualization] [PATCH v4 7/8] xen: TPM Emulator for Xen stubdoms
Kurt Bodiker
kurt.bodiker at braintrust-us.com
Fri Apr 27 08:12:10 PDT 2018
TPM Emulator is a software-based TPM and MTM emulator. This TPM Emulator
recipe creates a static library that is cross-compiled against MiniOS,
Xen, LWIP, Newlib, PolarSSL, and the stubdom-specific GMP headers and
subsequently used during the cross-compilation and linking of the Xen
vTPM and vTPM Manager stubdomains.
The current Xen source code is hardcoded to fetch a specific version of
this package. The patch files originate from the Xen/stubdom source
tree. This recipe provides the flexibility to change version or modify
the patches.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Bodiker <kurt.bodiker at braintrust-us.com>
---
Changes in v4:
- Fix whitespace errors in patchfiles
Changes in v3:
- none
Changes in v2:
- patches formatted to striplevel=1
---
recipes-extended/xen/files/tpmemu-0.7.4.patch | 12 ++
recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-bufsize.patch | 13 ++
recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-cmake-Wextra.patch | 21 +++
.../xen/files/vtpm-deepquote-anyloc.patch | 127 +++++++++++++
recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-deepquote.patch | 187 ++++++++++++++++++++
.../xen/files/vtpm-implicit-fallthrough.patch | 10 ++
recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-locality.patch | 50 ++++++
.../xen/files/vtpm-parent-sign-ek.patch | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++
recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator.inc | 37 ++++
recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator_0.7.4.bb | 26 +++
10 files changed, 679 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/files/tpmemu-0.7.4.patch
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-bufsize.patch
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-cmake-Wextra.patch
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-deepquote-anyloc.patch
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-deepquote.patch
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-implicit-fallthrough.patch
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-locality.patch
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-parent-sign-ek.patch
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator.inc
create mode 100644 recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator_0.7.4.bb
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/files/tpmemu-0.7.4.patch b/recipes-extended/xen/files/tpmemu-0.7.4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..622b34f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/files/tpmemu-0.7.4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -Naur tpm_emulator-x86_64-back/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.c tpm_emulator-x86_64/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.c
+--- a/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.c 2012-04-27 10:55:46.581963398 -0400
++++ b/tpm/tpm_emulator_extern.c 2012-04-27 10:56:02.193034152 -0400
+@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@
+ #else /* TPM_NO_EXTERN */
+
+ int (*tpm_extern_init)(void) = NULL;
+-int (*tpm_extern_release)(void) = NULL;
++void (*tpm_extern_release)(void) = NULL;
+ void* (*tpm_malloc)(size_t size) = NULL;
+ void (*tpm_free)(/*const*/ void *ptr) = NULL;
+ void (*tpm_log)(int priority, const char *fmt, ...) = NULL;
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-bufsize.patch b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-bufsize.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c9304c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-bufsize.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
+index d16a997..8088a2a 100644
+--- a/config.h.in
++++ b/config.h.in
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
+ #define TPM_STORAGE_NAME "${TPM_STORAGE_NAME}"
+ #define TPM_DEVICE_NAME "${TPM_DEVICE_NAME}"
+ #define TPM_LOG_FILE "${TPM_LOG_FILE}"
+-#define TPM_CMD_BUF_SIZE 4096
++#define TPM_CMD_BUF_SIZE 4088
+
+ #endif /* _CONFIG_H_ */
+
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-cmake-Wextra.patch b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-cmake-Wextra.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fee4e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-cmake-Wextra.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+ CMakeLists.txt | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: tpm_emulator-x86_64/CMakeLists.txt
+===================================================================
+--- a/CMakeLists.txt
++++ b/CMakeLists.txt
+@@ -40,10 +40,11 @@ set(TPM_STORAGE_NAME "/var/lib/tpm/tpm_e
+ set(TPM_DEVICE_NAME "/dev/tpm")
+ endif()
+ configure_file(${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/config.h.in ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/config.h)
+-add_definitions(-Wall -Werror -Wno-unused-parameter -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wwrite-strings)
++add_definitions(-Wall -Werror)
+ if("${CMAKE_SYSTEM}" MATCHES "Linux")
+ add_definitions(-Wextra)
+ endif()
++add_definitions(-Wno-unused-parameter -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wwrite-strings)
+ if(USE_OPENSSL)
+ add_definitions(-DUSE_OPENSSL)
+ endif()
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-deepquote-anyloc.patch b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-deepquote-anyloc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b37d51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-deepquote-anyloc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+index 69511d1..7545d51 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+@@ -3347,12 +3347,13 @@ static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+ {
+ TPM_NONCE nonce;
+ TPM_RESULT res;
+- UINT32 sigSize;
+- BYTE *sig;
++ UINT32 quote_blob_size;
++ BYTE *quote_blob;
+ BYTE *ptr;
+ UINT32 len;
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION myPCR;
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptPCR;
++ UINT32 extraInfoFlags = 0;
+
+ tpm_compute_in_param_digest(req);
+
+@@ -3361,17 +3362,19 @@ static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+ if (tpm_unmarshal_TPM_NONCE(&ptr, &len, &nonce)
+ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &myPCR)
+ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &ptPCR)
++ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_DEEP_QUOTE_INFO(&ptr, &len, &extraInfoFlags)
+ || len != 0) return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
+
+- res = TPM_DeepQuote(&nonce, &myPCR, &ptPCR, &req->auth1, &sigSize, &sig);
++ res = TPM_DeepQuote(&nonce, &myPCR, &ptPCR, &req->auth1, extraInfoFlags,
++ "e_blob_size, "e_blob);
+ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
+- rsp->paramSize = len = sigSize;
++ rsp->paramSize = len = quote_blob_size;
+ rsp->param = ptr = tpm_malloc(len);
+- if (ptr == NULL || tpm_marshal_BLOB(&ptr, &len, sig, sigSize)) {
++ if (ptr == NULL || tpm_marshal_BLOB(&ptr, &len, quote_blob, quote_blob_size)) {
+ tpm_free(rsp->param);
+ res = TPM_FAIL;
+ }
+- tpm_free(sig);
++ tpm_free(quote_blob);
+
+ return res;
+ }
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_commands.h b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+index 328d1be..a56dd5f 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_commands.h
++++ b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+@@ -3077,6 +3077,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(
+ * @myPCR: [in] PCR selection for the virtual TPM
+ * @ptPCR: [in] PCR selection for the hardware TPM
+ * @auth1: [in, out] Authorization protocol parameters
++ * @extraInfoFlags [in] Flags for including, kernel hash, group info, etc
+ * @sigSize: [out] The length of the returned digital signature
+ * @sig: [out] The resulting digital signature and PCR values
+ * Returns: TPM_SUCCESS on success, a TPM error code otherwise.
+@@ -3086,6 +3087,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR,
+ TPM_AUTH *auth1,
++ UINT32 extraInfoFlags,
+ UINT32 *sigSize,
+ BYTE **sig
+ );
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+index c0d62e7..6586c22 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+@@ -183,7 +183,8 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_OwnerReadInternalPub(TPM_KEY_HANDLE keyHandle, TPM_AUTH *auth1,
+
+ int endorsementKeyFresh = 0;
+
+-TPM_RESULT VTPM_GetParentQuote(TPM_DIGEST* data, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig);
++TPM_RESULT VTPM_GetParentQuote(TPM_NONCE *data, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
++ UINT32 extraInfoFlags, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig);
+
+ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
+ TPM_AUTH *auth1, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig)
+@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
+ TPM_PUBKEY pubKey;
+ TPM_RESULT res;
+ TPM_DIGEST hres;
+-
++ UINT32 extraInfoFlags = 0;
+ info("TPM_ParentSignEK()");
+
+ res = tpm_verify_auth(auth1, tpmData.permanent.data.ownerAuth, TPM_KH_OWNER);
+@@ -206,7 +207,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
+ res = TPM_FAIL;
+
+ if (res == TPM_SUCCESS)
+- res = VTPM_GetParentQuote(&hres, sel, sigSize, sig);
++ res = VTPM_GetParentQuote((TPM_NONCE*)&hres, sel, extraInfoFlags, sigSize, sig);
+
+ free_TPM_PUBKEY(pubKey);
+ return res;
+@@ -218,7 +219,7 @@ static const BYTE dquot_hdr[] = {
+
+ TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
+ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR, TPM_AUTH *auth1,
+- UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig)
++ UINT32 extraInfoFlags, UINT32 *quote_blob_size, BYTE **quote_blob)
+ {
+ TPM_RESULT res;
+ TPM_DIGEST hres;
+@@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
+
+ tpm_free(buf);
+
+- res = VTPM_GetParentQuote(&hres, ptPCR, sigSize, sig);
++ res = VTPM_GetParentQuote((TPM_NONCE*)&hres, ptPCR, extraInfoFlags, quote_blob_size, quote_blob);
+
+ return res;
+ }
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_marshalling.h b/tpm/tpm_marshalling.h
+index d510ebe..2e0c008 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_marshalling.h
++++ b/tpm/tpm_marshalling.h
+@@ -268,6 +268,8 @@ static inline int tpm_unmarshal_BOOL(BYTE **ptr, UINT32 *length, BOOL *v)
+ #define tpm_unmarshal_TPM_REDIR_COMMAND tpm_unmarshal_UINT32
+ #define tpm_marshal_DAAHANDLE tpm_marshal_UINT32
+ #define tpm_unmarshal_DAAHANDLE tpm_unmarshal_UINT32
++#define tpm_marshal_TPM_DEEP_QUOTE_INFO tpm_marshal_UINT32
++#define tpm_unmarshal_TPM_DEEP_QUOTE_INFO tpm_unmarshal_UINT32
+
+ int tpm_marshal_UINT32_ARRAY(BYTE **ptr, UINT32 *length, UINT32 *v, UINT32 n);
+ int tpm_unmarshal_UINT32_ARRAY(BYTE **ptr, UINT32 *length, UINT32 *v, UINT32 n);
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-deepquote.patch b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-deepquote.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6344f38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-deepquote.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+index 0fabf98..69511d1 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+@@ -3343,6 +3343,39 @@ static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+ return res;
+ }
+
++static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
++{
++ TPM_NONCE nonce;
++ TPM_RESULT res;
++ UINT32 sigSize;
++ BYTE *sig;
++ BYTE *ptr;
++ UINT32 len;
++ TPM_PCR_SELECTION myPCR;
++ TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptPCR;
++
++ tpm_compute_in_param_digest(req);
++
++ ptr = req->param;
++ len = req->paramSize;
++ if (tpm_unmarshal_TPM_NONCE(&ptr, &len, &nonce)
++ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &myPCR)
++ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &ptPCR)
++ || len != 0) return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
++
++ res = TPM_DeepQuote(&nonce, &myPCR, &ptPCR, &req->auth1, &sigSize, &sig);
++ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
++ rsp->paramSize = len = sigSize;
++ rsp->param = ptr = tpm_malloc(len);
++ if (ptr == NULL || tpm_marshal_BLOB(&ptr, &len, sig, sigSize)) {
++ tpm_free(rsp->param);
++ res = TPM_FAIL;
++ }
++ tpm_free(sig);
++
++ return res;
++}
++
+ static void tpm_setup_rsp_auth(TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+ {
+ tpm_hmac_ctx_t hmac;
+@@ -4098,6 +4131,11 @@ void tpm_execute_command(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+ res = execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(req, rsp);
+ break;
+
++ case TPM_ORD_DeepQuote:
++ debug("[TPM_ORD_DeepQuote]");
++ res = execute_TPM_DeepQuote(req, rsp);
++ break;
++
+ default:
+ #ifdef MTM_EMULATOR
+ res = mtm_execute_command(req, rsp);
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_commands.h b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+index 7fef934..328d1be 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_commands.h
++++ b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+@@ -3071,6 +3071,25 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(
+ BYTE **sig
+ );
+
++/**
++ * TPM_DeepQuote - gets a hardware TPM quote of a vTPM's PCRs
++ * @externalData: [in] AntiReplay nonce to prevent replay of messages
++ * @myPCR: [in] PCR selection for the virtual TPM
++ * @ptPCR: [in] PCR selection for the hardware TPM
++ * @auth1: [in, out] Authorization protocol parameters
++ * @sigSize: [out] The length of the returned digital signature
++ * @sig: [out] The resulting digital signature and PCR values
++ * Returns: TPM_SUCCESS on success, a TPM error code otherwise.
++ */
++TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(
++ TPM_NONCE *externalData,
++ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
++ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR,
++ TPM_AUTH *auth1,
++ UINT32 *sigSize,
++ BYTE **sig
++);
++
+ /*
+ * Error handling
+ * [tpm_error.c]
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+index 01f29e6..c0d62e7 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+@@ -211,3 +211,49 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
+ free_TPM_PUBKEY(pubKey);
+ return res;
+ }
++
++static const BYTE dquot_hdr[] = {
++ 0, 0, 0, 0, 'D', 'Q', 'U', 'T'
++};
++
++TPM_RESULT TPM_DeepQuote(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *myPCR,
++ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *ptPCR, TPM_AUTH *auth1,
++ UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig)
++{
++ TPM_RESULT res;
++ TPM_DIGEST hres;
++ TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT pcrData;
++ tpm_sha1_ctx_t ctx;
++ BYTE *buf, *ptr;
++ UINT32 size, len;
++
++ info("TPM_DeepQuote()");
++
++ res = tpm_verify_auth(auth1, tpmData.permanent.data.ownerAuth, TPM_KH_OWNER);
++ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
++
++ res = tpm_compute_pcr_digest(myPCR, &pcrData.digestAtRelease, NULL);
++ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
++
++ pcrData.pcrSelection.sizeOfSelect = myPCR->sizeOfSelect;
++ memcpy(pcrData.pcrSelection.pcrSelect, myPCR->pcrSelect, myPCR->sizeOfSelect);
++ pcrData.localityAtRelease = 1 << tpmData.stany.flags.localityModifier;
++
++ size = len = sizeof_TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT(pcrData);
++ buf = ptr = tpm_malloc(size);
++ if (buf == NULL) return TPM_NOSPACE;
++ if (tpm_marshal_TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT(&ptr, &len, &pcrData))
++ return TPM_FAIL;
++
++ tpm_sha1_init(&ctx);
++ tpm_sha1_update(&ctx, dquot_hdr, 8);
++ tpm_sha1_update(&ctx, externalData->nonce, 20);
++ tpm_sha1_update(&ctx, buf, size);
++ tpm_sha1_final(&ctx, hres.digest);
++
++ tpm_free(buf);
++
++ res = VTPM_GetParentQuote(&hres, ptPCR, sigSize, sig);
++
++ return res;
++}
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_structures.h b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
+index b0f4625..dfb1894 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_structures.h
++++ b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
+@@ -660,6 +660,42 @@ typedef struct tdTPM_CMK_MA_APPROVAL {
+
+ /* VTPM-only commands: */
+ /*
++ * Deep Quote - Create quote of PCRs
++ * Input:
++ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
++ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of request
++ * TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal TPM_ORD_DeepQuote
++ * TPM_NONCE externData 20 bytes of external data
++ * TPM_PCR_SELECTION vtSel PCR selection for virtual TPM
++ * TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptSel PCR selection for physical TPM
++ * ---
++ * UINT32 authHandle Owner authorization session (OIAP)
++ * TPM_NONCE nonceOdd Nonce for authHandle
++ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
++ * TPM_AUTHDATA privAuth Authorization digest for command
++ *
++ * Output:
++ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
++ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of response
++ * TPM_RESULT returnCode Return code of the operation
++ * BYTE[] sig Signature provided by physical TPM
++ * TPM_PCRVALUE[] pcrValue Values of hardware PCRs used in the quote
++ * ---
++ * TPM_NONCE nonceEven Nonce for authHandle
++ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
++ * TPM_AUTHDATA resAuth Authorization digest for response
++ *
++ * The values of the virutal TPM's PCRs are not included in the response.
++ * The signature is a standard TPM_Quote response from the physical TPM; its
++ * externalData is the SHA1 hash of the following structure:
++ * TPM_STRUCT_VER version MUST be 0.0.0.0
++ * BYTE[4] fixed MUST be the string "DQUT"
++ * TPM_NONCE externData From input to the deep quote
++ * TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT pcrData Virtual TPM's PCRs
++ */
++#define TPM_ORD_DeepQuote (TPM_VENDOR_COMMAND | TPM_ORD_Quote)
++
++/*
+ * ParentSignEK - Proof of fresh provisioning and EK value
+ *
+ * Input:
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-implicit-fallthrough.patch b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-implicit-fallthrough.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e95d41f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-implicit-fallthrough.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c.orig 2017-04-27 13:37:14.408000000 +0200
++++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c 2017-04-27 13:39:53.585000000 +0200
+@@ -3397,6 +3397,7 @@
+ sizeof(rsp->auth2->nonceOdd.nonce));
+ tpm_hmac_update(&hmac, (BYTE*)&rsp->auth2->continueAuthSession, 1);
+ tpm_hmac_final(&hmac, rsp->auth2->auth);
++ /* fall-thru */
+ case TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND:
+ tpm_hmac_init(&hmac, rsp->auth1->secret, sizeof(rsp->auth1->secret));
+ tpm_hmac_update(&hmac, rsp->auth1->digest, sizeof(rsp->auth1->digest));
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-locality.patch b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-locality.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ab7dea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-locality.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_capability.c b/tpm/tpm_capability.c
+index 60bbb90..f8f7f0f 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_capability.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_capability.c
+@@ -949,6 +949,8 @@ static TPM_RESULT set_vendor(UINT32 subCap, BYTE *setValue,
+ UINT32 setValueSize, BOOL ownerAuth,
+ BOOL deactivated, BOOL disabled)
+ {
++ if (tpmData.stany.flags.localityModifier != 8)
++ return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
+ /* set the capability area with the specified data, on failure
+ deactivate the TPM */
+ switch (subCap) {
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+index 288d1ce..9e1cfb4 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+@@ -4132,7 +4132,7 @@ void tpm_emulator_shutdown()
+ tpm_extern_release();
+ }
+
+-int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint32_t *out_size)
++int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint32_t *out_size, int locality)
+ {
+ TPM_REQUEST req;
+ TPM_RESPONSE rsp;
+@@ -4140,7 +4140,9 @@ int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint3
+ UINT32 len;
+ BOOL free_out;
+
+- debug("tpm_handle_command()");
++ debug("tpm_handle_command(%d)", locality);
++ if (locality != -1)
++ tpmData.stany.flags.localityModifier = locality;
+
+ /* we need the whole packet at once, otherwise unmarshalling will fail */
+ if (tpm_unmarshal_TPM_REQUEST((uint8_t**)&in, &in_size, &req) != 0) {
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_emulator.h b/tpm/tpm_emulator.h
+index eed749e..4c228bd 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_emulator.h
++++ b/tpm/tpm_emulator.h
+@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ void tpm_emulator_shutdown(void);
+ * its usage. In case of an error, all internally allocated memory
+ * is released and the the state of out and out_size is unspecified.
+ */
+-int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint32_t *out_size);
++int tpm_handle_command(const uint8_t *in, uint32_t in_size, uint8_t **out, uint32_t *out_size, int locality);
+
+ #endif /* _TPM_EMULATOR_H_ */
+
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-parent-sign-ek.patch b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-parent-sign-ek.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14e66ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/files/vtpm-parent-sign-ek.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+index 9e1cfb4..0fabf98 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_cmd_handler.c
+@@ -3312,6 +3312,37 @@ static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_OwnerReadPubek(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp
+ return res;
+ }
+
++static TPM_RESULT execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
++{
++ TPM_NONCE nonce;
++ TPM_RESULT res;
++ UINT32 sigSize;
++ BYTE *sig;
++ BYTE *ptr;
++ UINT32 len;
++ TPM_PCR_SELECTION targetPCR;
++
++ tpm_compute_in_param_digest(req);
++
++ ptr = req->param;
++ len = req->paramSize;
++ if (tpm_unmarshal_TPM_NONCE(&ptr, &len, &nonce)
++ || tpm_unmarshal_TPM_PCR_SELECTION(&ptr, &len, &targetPCR)
++ || len != 0) return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
++
++ res = TPM_ParentSignEK(&nonce, &targetPCR, &req->auth1, &sigSize, &sig);
++ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
++ rsp->paramSize = len = sigSize;
++ rsp->param = ptr = tpm_malloc(len);
++ if (ptr == NULL || tpm_marshal_BLOB(&ptr, &len, sig, sigSize)) {
++ tpm_free(rsp->param);
++ res = TPM_FAIL;
++ }
++ tpm_free(sig);
++
++ return res;
++}
++
+ static void tpm_setup_rsp_auth(TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+ {
+ tpm_hmac_ctx_t hmac;
+@@ -4062,6 +4093,11 @@ void tpm_execute_command(TPM_REQUEST *req, TPM_RESPONSE *rsp)
+ res = execute_TPM_OwnerReadPubek(req, rsp);
+ break;
+
++ case TPM_ORD_ParentSignEK:
++ debug("[TPM_ORD_ParentSignEK]");
++ res = execute_TPM_ParentSignEK(req, rsp);
++ break;
++
+ default:
+ #ifdef MTM_EMULATOR
+ res = mtm_execute_command(req, rsp);
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_commands.h b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+index a7666f6..7fef934 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_commands.h
++++ b/tpm/tpm_commands.h
+@@ -3054,6 +3054,23 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_OwnerReadPubek(
+ TPM_PUBKEY *pubEndorsementKey
+ );
+
++/**
++ * TPM_ParentSignEK - gets a hardware TPM quote of a vTPM's EK
++ * @externalData: [in] AntiReplay nonce to prevent replay of messages
++ * @sel: [in] PCR selection for the hardware TPM's quote
++ * @auth1: [in, out] Authorization protocol parameters
++ * @sigSize: [out] The length of the returned digital signature
++ * @sig: [out] The resulting digital signature and PCR values
++ * Returns: TPM_SUCCESS on success, a TPM error code otherwise.
++ */
++TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(
++ TPM_NONCE *externalData,
++ TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
++ TPM_AUTH *auth1,
++ UINT32 *sigSize,
++ BYTE **sig
++);
++
+ /*
+ * Error handling
+ * [tpm_error.c]
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+index 9cd64af..01f29e6 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_credentials.c
+@@ -180,3 +180,34 @@ TPM_RESULT TPM_OwnerReadInternalPub(TPM_KEY_HANDLE keyHandle, TPM_AUTH *auth1,
+ return TPM_BAD_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ }
++
++int endorsementKeyFresh = 0;
++
++TPM_RESULT VTPM_GetParentQuote(TPM_DIGEST* data, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig);
++
++TPM_RESULT TPM_ParentSignEK(TPM_NONCE *externalData, TPM_PCR_SELECTION *sel,
++ TPM_AUTH *auth1, UINT32 *sigSize, BYTE **sig)
++{
++ TPM_PUBKEY pubKey;
++ TPM_RESULT res;
++ TPM_DIGEST hres;
++
++ info("TPM_ParentSignEK()");
++
++ res = tpm_verify_auth(auth1, tpmData.permanent.data.ownerAuth, TPM_KH_OWNER);
++ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
++
++ if (!endorsementKeyFresh) return TPM_DISABLED_CMD;
++
++ res = tpm_get_pubek(&pubKey);
++ if (res != TPM_SUCCESS) return res;
++
++ if (tpm_compute_pubkey_checksum(externalData, &pubKey, &hres))
++ res = TPM_FAIL;
++
++ if (res == TPM_SUCCESS)
++ res = VTPM_GetParentQuote(&hres, sel, sigSize, sig);
++
++ free_TPM_PUBKEY(pubKey);
++ return res;
++}
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_data.c b/tpm/tpm_data.c
+index 50c9697..6a0c499 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_data.c
++++ b/tpm/tpm_data.c
+@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ static void init_timeouts(void)
+ tpmData.permanent.data.cmd_durations[2] = 1000;
+ }
+
++extern int endorsementKeyFresh;
++
+ void tpm_init_data(void)
+ {
+ /* endorsement key */
+@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ void tpm_init_data(void)
+ if (tpmConf & TPM_CONF_GENERATE_EK) {
+ /* generate a new endorsement key */
+ tpm_rsa_generate_key(&tpmData.permanent.data.endorsementKey, 2048);
++ endorsementKeyFresh = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* setup endorsement key */
+ tpm_rsa_import_key(&tpmData.permanent.data.endorsementKey,
+diff --git a/tpm/tpm_structures.h b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
+index f746c05..b0f4625 100644
+--- a/tpm/tpm_structures.h
++++ b/tpm/tpm_structures.h
+@@ -658,6 +658,49 @@ typedef struct tdTPM_CMK_MA_APPROVAL {
+ #define TPM_ORD_TickStampBlob 242
+ #define TPM_ORD_MAX 256
+
++/* VTPM-only commands: */
++/*
++ * ParentSignEK - Proof of fresh provisioning and EK value
++ *
++ * Input:
++ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND
++ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of request
++ * TPM_COMMAND_CODE ordinal TPM_ORD_ParentSignEK
++ * TPM_NONCE externData 20 bytes of external data
++ * TPM_PCR_SELECTION ptSel PCR selection for physical TPM
++ * ---
++ * UINT32 authHandle Owner authorization session (OIAP)
++ * TPM_NONCE nonceOdd Nonce for authHandle
++ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
++ * TPM_AUTHDATA privAuth Authorization digest for command
++ *
++ * Output:
++ * TPM_TAG tag TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND
++ * UINT32 paramSize Total size of response
++ * TPM_RESULT returnCode Return code of the operation
++ * BYTE[] sig Signature provided by physical TPM
++ * TPM_PCRVALUE[] pcrValue Values of hardware PCRs used in the quote
++ * ---
++ * TPM_NONCE nonceEven Nonce for authHandle
++ * BOOL continueAuth Continue flag for authHandle
++ * TPM_AUTHDATA resAuth Authorization digest for response
++ *
++ * This command is only valid on the first boot of a vTPM; on any subsequent
++ * boot, the command returns TPM_DISABLED_CMD. It is intended to be used to
++ * provide evidence of proper platform configuration to the verifier/CA which is
++ * responsible for the creation of the vTPM's endorsement credential, which will
++ * be used on subsequent boots to certify AIKs via the usual Privacy CA protocol.
++ *
++ * The values of the virtual TPM's PCRs are not included in the response.
++ * The signature is a standard TPM_Quote response from the physical TPM; its
++ * externalData is the SHA1 hash of the following structure:
++ * TPM_PUBKEY pubEK The vTPM's public EK
++ * TPM_NONCE externData From input to the deep quote
++ *
++ * This structure was chosen to match the return of TPM_ReadPubek
++ */
++#define TPM_ORD_ParentSignEK (TPM_VENDOR_COMMAND | TPM_ORD_ReadPubek)
++
+ /*
+ * TCS Ordinals ([TPM_Part2], Section 17.1)
+ *
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator.inc b/recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator.inc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f58a276
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Copyright (C) 2017 Kurt Bodiker <kurt.bodiker at braintrust-us.com>
+# Released under the MIT license (see COPYING.MIT for the terms)
+
+require stubdom.inc
+
+DEPENDS += "\
+ cmake-native \
+ newlib \
+ stubdom-gmp \
+"
+
+# nothing to configure
+do_configure[noexec] = "1"
+
+export CMAKE_C_FLAGS = "\
+ -std=c99 \
+ -DTPM_NO_EXTERN \
+ ${STUBDOM_CPPFLAGS} \
+ ${STUBDOM_CFLAGS} \
+ -Wno-declaration-after-statement \
+ -Wno-implicit-fallthrough \
+"
+
+do_compile() {
+ CC="${HOST_PREFIX}gcc --sysroot=${RECIPE_SYSROOT}" cmake .. -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS:STRING="${CMAKE_C_FLAGS}"
+ ${MAKE} VERBOSE=1 tpm_crypto tpm
+}
+
+do_install() {
+ install -d ${D}/${libdir}
+ install -m 644 -t ${D}/${libdir} ${B}/crypto/libtpm_crypto.a
+ install -m 644 -t ${D}/${libdir} ${B}/tpm/libtpm.a
+
+ install -D -m 644 -t ${D}/${includedir}/tpm-emulator/build ${S}/build/config.h
+ install -D -m 644 -t ${D}/${includedir}/tpm-emulator/crypto ${S}/crypto/*.h
+ install -D -m 644 -t ${D}/${includedir}/tpm-emulator/tpm ${S}/tpm/*.h
+}
diff --git a/recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator_0.7.4.bb b/recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator_0.7.4.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7207676
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/xen/tpm-emulator_0.7.4.bb
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Copyright (C) 2017 Kurt Bodiker <kurt.bodiker at braintrust-us.com>
+# Released under the MIT license (see COPYING.MIT for the terms)
+
+DESCRIPTION = "TPM Emulator"
+HOMEPAGE = "http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles"
+LICENSE = "GPL"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://README;md5=eeabd77cf8fd8a8bc42983884cb09863"
+
+SRC_URI = "\
+ http://xenbits.xen.org/xen-extfiles/tpm_emulator-${PV}.tar.gz;name=tpm-emulator \
+ file://tpmemu-0.7.4.patch \
+ file://vtpm-bufsize.patch \
+ file://vtpm-locality.patch \
+ file://vtpm-parent-sign-ek.patch \
+ file://vtpm-deepquote.patch \
+ file://vtpm-deepquote-anyloc.patch \
+ file://vtpm-cmake-Wextra.patch \
+ file://vtpm-implicit-fallthrough.patch \
+"
+SRC_URI[tpm-emulator.md5sum] = "e26becb8a6a2b6695f6b3e8097593db8"
+SRC_URI[tpm-emulator.sha256sum] = "4e48ea0d83dd9441cc1af04ab18cd6c961b9fa54d5cbf2c2feee038988dea459"
+
+S="${WORKDIR}/tpm_emulator-${PV}"
+B="${S}/build"
+
+require tpm-emulator.inc
--
2.14.2
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