[meta-freescale] [PATCH 5/8] linux-qoriq: update to b14540e

Chunrong Guo B40290 at freescale.com
Fri Mar 17 00:51:06 PDT 2017


From: Ting Liu <ting.liu at nxp.com>

* merged upstream v4.1.35 release.
* support LS1012A
* Includes additional workarounds for Chip Errata: A-010284, A-010150, A-008975

Signed-off-by: Zhenhua Luo <zhenhua.luo at nxp.com>
---
 .../CVE-2016-5696-limiting-of-all-challenge.patch  | 111 ---------------------
 ...5696-make-challenge-acks-less-predictable.patch |  90 -----------------
 recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq_4.1.bb            |   5 +-
 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq/CVE-2016-5696-limiting-of-all-challenge.patch
 delete mode 100644 recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq/CVE-2016-5696-make-challenge-acks-less-predictable.patch

diff --git a/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq/CVE-2016-5696-limiting-of-all-challenge.patch b/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq/CVE-2016-5696-limiting-of-all-challenge.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d1f97cd..0000000
--- a/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq/CVE-2016-5696-limiting-of-all-challenge.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-From 5413f1a526d2d51d7a5768133c90936c017165c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jason Baron <jbaron at akamai.com>
-Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 11:38:40 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] tcp: enable per-socket rate limiting of all 'challenge acks'
-
-[ Upstream commit 083ae308280d13d187512b9babe3454342a7987e ]
-
-The per-socket rate limit for 'challenge acks' was introduced in the
-context of limiting ack loops:
-
-commit f2b2c582e824 ("tcp: mitigate ACK loops for connections as tcp_sock")
-
-And I think it can be extended to rate limit all 'challenge acks' on a
-per-socket basis.
-
-Since we have the global tcp_challenge_ack_limit, this patch allows for
-tcp_challenge_ack_limit to be set to a large value and effectively rely on
-the per-socket limit, or set tcp_challenge_ack_limit to a lower value and
-still prevents a single connections from consuming the entire challenge ack
-quota.
-
-It further moves in the direction of eliminating the global limit at some
-point, as Eric Dumazet has suggested. This a follow-up to:
-Subject: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
-
-CVE: CVE-2016-5696
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>
-Cc: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
-Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell at google.com>
-Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng at google.com>
-Cc: Yue Cao <ycao009 at ucr.edu>
-Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron at akamai.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
-Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi at enea.com>
-Signed-off-by: Adrian Dudau <adrian.dudau at enea.com>
-
----
- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-index 05f10df..12b98e2 100644
---- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-@@ -3390,6 +3390,23 @@ static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32
- 	return flag;
- }
- 
-+static bool __tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, int mib_idx,
-+				   u32 *last_oow_ack_time)
-+{
-+	if (*last_oow_ack_time) {
-+		s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_time_stamp - *last_oow_ack_time);
-+
-+		if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit) {
-+			NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, mib_idx);
-+			return true;	/* rate-limited: don't send yet! */
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_time_stamp;
-+
-+	return false;	/* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! */
-+}
-+
- /* Return true if we're currently rate-limiting out-of-window ACKs and
-  * thus shouldn't send a dupack right now. We rate-limit dupacks in
-  * response to out-of-window SYNs or ACKs to mitigate ACK loops or DoS
-@@ -3403,21 +3420,9 @@ bool tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb,
- 	/* Data packets without SYNs are not likely part of an ACK loop. */
- 	if ((TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq) &&
- 	    !tcp_hdr(skb)->syn)
--		goto not_rate_limited;
--
--	if (*last_oow_ack_time) {
--		s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_time_stamp - *last_oow_ack_time);
--
--		if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit) {
--			NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, mib_idx);
--			return true;	/* rate-limited: don't send yet! */
--		}
--	}
--
--	*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_time_stamp;
-+		return false;
- 
--not_rate_limited:
--	return false;	/* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! */
-+	return __tcp_oow_rate_limited(net, mib_idx, last_oow_ack_time);
- }
- 
- /* RFC 5961 7 [ACK Throttling] */
-@@ -3430,9 +3435,9 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
- 	u32 count, now;
- 
- 	/* First check our per-socket dupack rate limit. */
--	if (tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
--				 LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDCHALLENGE,
--				 &tp->last_oow_ack_time))
-+	if (__tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk),
-+				   LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDCHALLENGE,
-+				   &tp->last_oow_ack_time))
- 		return;
- 
- 	/* Then check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq/CVE-2016-5696-make-challenge-acks-less-predictable.patch b/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq/CVE-2016-5696-make-challenge-acks-less-predictable.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 072671a..0000000
--- a/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq/CVE-2016-5696-make-challenge-acks-less-predictable.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-From 72c2d3bccaba4a0a4de354f9d2d24eccd05bfccf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>
-Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2016 10:04:02 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
-
-[ Upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 ]
-
-Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
-(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
-to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
-paper.
-
-This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
-some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
-sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
-
-Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
-
-Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
-to remove the host limit in the future.
-
-v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
-
-CVE: CVE-2016-5696
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
-Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009 at ucr.edu>
-Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet at google.com>
-Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
-Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng at google.com>
-Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell at google.com>
-Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell at google.com>
-Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng at google.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
-Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi at enea.com>
-Signed-off-by: Adrian Dudau <adrian.dudau at enea.com>
-
----
- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-index d4c5115..05f10df 100644
---- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_mostly = 1;
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
- 
- /* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
--int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100;
-+int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
- 
- int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly;
- int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly;
-@@ -3427,7 +3427,7 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
- 	static u32 challenge_timestamp;
- 	static unsigned int challenge_count;
- 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
--	u32 now;
-+	u32 count, now;
- 
- 	/* First check our per-socket dupack rate limit. */
- 	if (tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
-@@ -3435,13 +3435,18 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
- 				 &tp->last_oow_ack_time))
- 		return;
- 
--	/* Then check the check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
-+	/* Then check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
- 	now = jiffies / HZ;
- 	if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
-+		u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
-+
- 		challenge_timestamp = now;
--		challenge_count = 0;
-+		WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, half +
-+			   prandom_u32_max(sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit));
- 	}
--	if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
-+	count = READ_ONCE(challenge_count);
-+	if (count > 0) {
-+		WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, count - 1);
- 		NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
- 		tcp_send_ack(sk);
- 	}
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq_4.1.bb b/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq_4.1.bb
index 587ecd9..6c2b235 100644
--- a/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq_4.1.bb
+++ b/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-qoriq_4.1.bb
@@ -13,12 +13,10 @@ SRC_URI = "git://git.freescale.com/ppc/sdk/linux.git;nobranch=1 \
     file://fix-the-compile-issue-under-gcc6.patch \
     file://only-set-vmpic_msi_feature-if-CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT-.patch \
     file://powerpc-fsl-Fix-build-of-the-dtb-embedded-kernel-images.patch \
-    file://CVE-2016-5696-limiting-of-all-challenge.patch \
-    file://CVE-2016-5696-make-challenge-acks-less-predictable.patch \
     file://CVE-2016-2053.patch \
     file://CVE-2016-0758.patch \
 "
-SRCREV = "4004071c129a776136e71f6a85383fea87f5db75"
+SRCREV = "b14540ee315f79f6a5dfc621e7f4217c8fac7d1c"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 
@@ -37,6 +35,7 @@ SCMVERSION ?= "y"
 LOCALVERSION = ""
 DELTA_KERNEL_DEFCONFIG ?= ""
 DELTA_KERNEL_DEFCONFIG_prepend_qoriq-arm64 = "freescale.config "
+DELTA_KERNEL_DEFCONFIG_prepend_fsl-lsch2-32b = "freescale_aarch32.config "
 
 do_merge_delta_config() {
     # copy desired defconfig so we pick it up for the real kernel_do_configure
-- 
1.9.0



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