[meta-freescale] [meta-freescale PATCH 1/3] openssl-qoriq: Sync with OE-Core recipe changes
Otavio Salvador
otavio at ossystems.com.br
Fri Sep 16 10:21:40 PDT 2016
This synchronizes the OpenSSL recipe with OE-Core as well as includes
the CVE-2016-2178 and CVE-2016-2177 security fixes in this fork.
Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio at ossystems.com.br>
---
recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq.inc | 8 +-
.../openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2178.patch | 51 ++++
.../openssl/openssl-qoriq_1.0.2h.bb | 2 +
4 files changed, 345 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2177.patch
create mode 100644 recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2178.patch
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq.inc b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq.inc
index 8c8c036..dfafaaf 100644
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq.inc
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq.inc
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ SECTION = "libs/network"
LICENSE = "openssl"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=f9a8f968107345e0b75aa8c2ecaa7ec8"
-DEPENDS = "hostperl-runtime-native"
+DEPENDS = "makedepend-native hostperl-runtime-native"
DEPENDS_append_class-target = " openssl-native"
PROVIDES = "openssl"
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ do_configure () {
target=linux-elf-armeb
;;
linux-aarch64*)
- target=linux-aarch64
+ target=linux-generic64
;;
linux-sh3)
target=debian-sh3
@@ -160,10 +160,14 @@ do_compile_prepend_class-target () {
}
do_compile () {
+ oe_runmake depend
oe_runmake
}
do_compile_ptest () {
+ # build dependencies for test directory too
+ export DIRS="$DIRS test"
+ oe_runmake depend
oe_runmake buildtest
}
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2177.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df36d5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2177.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
+
+A common idiom in the codebase is:
+
+if (p + len > limit)
+{
+ return; /* Too long */
+}
+
+Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
+limit == p + SIZE
+
+"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
+message).
+
+The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
+defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
+undefined behaviour.
+
+For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
+provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
+values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
+
+Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
+
+CVE-2016-2177
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-2177
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster at mvista.com>
+
+
+---
+ ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+
+ session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j = *(p++);
+
+- if (p + j > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* cookie stuff */
+- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ }
+
+ /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+
+ /* compression */
+ i = *(p++);
+- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+index b182998..54ee783 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ int r;
+ #endif
+
+- if (session_id + len > limit) {
++ if (limit - session_id < len) {
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index fb64607..cdac011 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+ };
+
+- if (data >= (limit - 2))
++ if (limit - data <= 2)
+ return;
+ data += 2;
+
+- if (data > (limit - 4))
++ if (limit - data < 4)
+ return;
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ return;
+
+- if (data + size > limit)
++ if (limit - data < size)
+ return;
+ data += size;
+
+@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+ return;
+@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ } else {
+ const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+- if (data + len != limit)
++ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+ return;
+@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ if (data == limit)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+- if (data > (limit - 2))
++ if (limit - data < 2)
+ goto err;
+
+ n2s(data, len);
+
+- if (data + len != limit)
++ if (limit - data != len)
+ goto err;
+
+- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+- if (data + size > (limit))
++ if (limit - data < size)
+ goto err;
+ # if 0
+ fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
+@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
+ if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+- if (data >= limit - 2)
++ if (limit - data <= 2)
+ return 1;
+ n2s(data, len);
+
+- if (data > limit - len)
++ if (limit - data < len)
+ return 1;
+
+- while (data <= limit - 4) {
++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+- if (data + size > limit)
++ if (limit - data < size)
+ return 1;
+ if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+ # endif
+
+- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ n2s(data, length);
+- if (data + length != d + n) {
++ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+- if (data + size > (d + n))
++ if ((d + n) - data < size)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ i = *(p++);
+- p += i;
+- if (p >= limit)
++
++ if (limit - p <= i)
+ return -1;
++
++ p += i;
+ }
+ /* Skip past cipher list */
+ n2s(p, i);
+- p += i;
+- if (p >= limit)
++ if (limit - p <= i)
+ return -1;
++ p += i;
++
+ /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+ i = *(p++);
+- p += i;
+- if (p > limit)
++ if (limit - p < i)
+ return -1;
++ p += i;
++
+ /* Now at start of extensions */
+- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
++ if (limit - p <= 2)
+ return 0;
+ n2s(p, i);
+- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
++ while (limit - p >= 4) {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ n2s(p, type);
+ n2s(p, size);
+- if (p + size > limit)
++ if (limit - p < size)
+ return 0;
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ int r;
+--
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2178.patch b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2178.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27ade4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/CVE-2016-2178.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida at aalto.fi>
+Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+
+Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
+order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
+implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
+certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
+attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
+
+CVE-2016-2178
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-2178
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster at mvista.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 9 +++++----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
+ if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
+ goto err;
+ while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
+- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+- }
+
+ if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+@@ -282,6 +279,11 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
+ } else {
+ K = &k;
+ }
++
++ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
++ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++ }
++
+ DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
+ dsa->method_mont_p);
+ if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq_1.0.2h.bb b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq_1.0.2h.bb
index f67d3de..1c66fb9 100644
--- a/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq_1.0.2h.bb
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq_1.0.2h.bb
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://find.pl;subdir=openssl-${PV}/util/ \
file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \
file://configure-musl-target.patch \
file://parallel.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
"
SRC_URI += "file://0001-remove-double-initialization-of-cryptodev-engine.patch \
file://0002-eng_cryptodev-add-support-for-TLS-algorithms-offload.patch \
--
2.9.3
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